

THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA: A CHALLENGE TO THE WEST

January 1959

Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-02771R000300490005-8

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In the post-war era one of the most notable developments and a subject of international concern has been the tide of nationalism rolling irresistably across the former colonial areas of the world. Reaching its flood first in Asia and then in the Middle East, this tide has now swept on to Black Africa. Colored peoples who only yesterday were considered to be emerging from barbarism are today demanding and receiving their independence.

This rise of new nations is important not only because of the readjustments which must be made in the thinking and actions of the former tutelary powers and in the complex patterns of international diplomatic and trade relationships, but also because each new nation adds further territory to the arena of the Cold War. While the West seeks to retain these nations in the Western camp, the Soviet Bloc wages an intensive campaign to win them away from the West or at least to assure their benevolent neutrality.

The latest territory to be catapulted into the international scene by the force of nationalism, and thus to become an issue of contention between East and West, is the world's newest independent state--the Republic of Guinea.

A. The Land and the People

The area which formally emerged as an independent political entity on 2 October 1958, as the result of a proclamation by the French Government, is a country of 2,500,000 inhabitants, including, as of 1951, 4,581 Frenchmen and 2,184 other whites. Situated in the Bulge of Africa, its neighbors are Portuguese Guinea, Senegal and French Sudan to the north, French Sudan and the Ivory Coast to the east, Sierra Leone and Liberia to the south, and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. In size, it is roughly comparable to the German Federal Republic, with an area of approximately 275,000 square kilometers.

Although Guinea is today a state, there is not yet a Guinean nation. Guinean society is still largely tribal in nature, despite the inroads made on the authority of tribal leaders and customs by the political and economic developments of the last decade. The differences between various tribal peoples are greater than those between, for example, an Icelandic and a Greek.

Of the various tribal groups the most important are: (1) the Fulah (Fulah), numbering about 900,000 and inhabiting the mountainous Fouta Djallon, (2) the Malinke (Mandingo), numbering about 600,000 in Upper Guinea and some parts of Lower Guinea, and (3) the Soussou, who inhabit the coastal region and number about 325,000. The remaining 25 percent of the population is composed of members of a great variety of tribes, all bearing names which sound unfamiliar to the Western ear and are largely unknown except to anthropologists, for example, Guerze, Badyaranké, Tyapi, Dyalonke, Baga and Konigui.

The dominant religion is a form of Islam which, as in other parts of Black Africa, is constantly growing in strength. The Fulah are completely Islamized, but many coastal inhabitants, those of the forest region and even many of the Malinke are still essentially animists.

Guinea's terrain, like its people, varies considerably, and four distinct geographic regions can be distinguished:

1. Lower Guinea is an alluvial coastal plain of some 50 by 90 kilometers, traversed by sinuous rivers with large deltas, the historically famous "Rivers of the South": Malacoree, Konkoure, Rio Pongo, Rio Espatches, Rio Nuneh, and Rio Componi. The climate is characterized by abundant rainfall from June to November, which averages four to six meters a year.

2. Middle Guinea comprises the Fouta Djallon, a massif of 80,000 square kilometers, with peaks as high as 1,500 meters. Broken by mountain ranges into a number of plateaus, the Fouta Djallon is the area in which arise the great rivers of West Africa--the Senegal, the Niger and the Gambia.

3. Upper Guinea is an area of flat country closely resembling the terrain of neighboring French Sudan, with broad low valleys. With a seasonal temperature variation of from 18 to 40 degrees, it enjoys a somewhat continental climate.

4. The fourth geographic area is the forest region in the east and south, with luxuriant vegetation like that of the Ivory Coast. Largely separated from the rest of Guinea, it is oriented economically towards Liberia whose capital of Monrovia is its most logical port outlet.

Economically Guinea is a poor country and an underdeveloped one, although its potential is great. Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy in terms both of manpower and value of product. The principal crops are bananas, coffee, and palm-kernels, which in 1956 accounted for approximately 67 percent

of all exports. Secondary exports include orange essence, groundnuts, pineapples, oil seeds, kola nuts, animal products and tobacco. Much rice is grown for local consumption, but demand still requires the importation of large additional amounts (9,488 tons in 1956). Possible future export products include tea, quinine and silk cocoons, which have been the subject of study and experimentation for the past several years.

Animal husbandry has not yet developed to any considerable extent, although some animal products are exported. In 1956 the country's animal population included 1,337,000 cattle, 350,000 sheep, 350,000 goats, 1,100 horses, 1,600 asses, and 7,300 pigs.

The country's hopes for economic improvement rest primarily on its vast mineral resources, which have only begun to be exploited. Production of iron ore, started in 1953 by the Compagnie Miniere de Conakry on the Kalaou Peninsula just behind Conakry, reached 833,000 tons in 1956 and is expected to continue to increase. Huge deposits of bauxite are found in various parts of the country, notably in the Los Islands and the Boko and Kindia-Fria districts, but as yet only the Los deposits are being worked. Diamonds are found in the Macenta district, while the ancient gold mines in the Siguiri area still yield some gold (200 kilograms in 1956). It is considered certain that careful geologic surveys would determine deposits of many other minerals.

The following table shows Guinea's main exports in 1955 and 1956, as reported by the Haut Commissariat de la Republique en Afrique Occidentale Francaise:

Item	Amount (1,000 tons)		Value (million francs CFA)*	
	1955	1956	1955	1956
Coffee	9.31	11.103	1,441	1,506
Bananas	98.001	91.061	1,513	1,305
Palm-kernels	21.301	21.878	446	479
Iron ore	676	833	667	733
Bauxite	449	457	500	500
Diamonds	25,627 (grams)	256,000 (carats)	54	138

* One franc CFA (Colonies Francaises d'Afrique) is equal to two metropolitan francs.

As yet Guinea lacks much of the infrastructure necessary for an advanced economy, which suggests many possibilities for future foreign investment. Aside from 12 kilometers of track linking Conakry to the nearby iron ore deposits at Kaloum, the country's only railroad is a single-track, 662-kilometer line from Conakry to Kankan. Another 255 kilometers (approximate) are now either under construction or planned in connection with the Fria and Boké bauxite exploitations (see below).

Roads in the country are generally poor and inadequate. The main road leading inland from Conakry is bituminous surfaced as far as Kindia (about 166 kilometers to the northeast) and, as of 1956, was being improved an additional 150 kilometers to Mamou. Guinea has only 3,500 kilometers of all-weather roads, plus 7,000 kilometers of dry season roads. Vehicles in the country include 2,213 passenger cars, 4,075 trucks, 42 buses, 873 tractors and 7 trailers.

Production of electrical energy totalled 10,106,000 kilowatt-hours in 1955 and 12,970,000 in 1956. The abundant water courses of Guinea constitute an unlimited energy potential.

School facilities, like roads and railroads, are far from adequate. As of 1956 there were only 171 primary schools (26,531 students), 53 private schools (7,278 students), 10 secondary schools (1,319 students), one technical college and 17 vocational centers.

Banking facilities include branches of the Banque de l'Afrique Occidentale, Credit Lyonnais and Banque Commercial Africaine in Conakry, and the Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie in Conakry, Kindia, Kankan and Siguiré. In 1956, 26 branches of the savings bank had 12,682 depositors with 118,697,000 francs CFA to their credit.

Conakry, with a population of approximately 50,000 is Guinea's largest city, its capital, and its only port of any consequence. Located on the Ile Tombo, just off the Camayenne Peninsula, it is connected to the mainland by a 200-foot stone causeway. The harbor, which is formed by a series of breakwaters, covers an area of 500 acres. Also generally considered as part of the Conakry port complex are the bauxite loading facilities on the Ile de Kissi, one of the Loz Islands, which lie two to eight miles southwest of Conakry.

Conakry at present has about 5,700 linear feet of alongside wharfage, where general cargo is handled by ship's gear and shore cranes. Bananas are loaded by portable conveyors, iron ore and bauxite by fixed conveyors and traveling loading towers. Petroleum is discharged by pipeline. The port has

15 cranes and 53 harbor craft. There are 174,700 square feet of covered storage, 81,123 cubic feet of refrigerated storage for bananas, 30 acres of open storage, and 7 tanks for petroleum storage with a capacity of 105,000 barrels. Port facilities are now being expanded, but much still remains to be done.

There are two other harbors which could be and, it is hoped, eventually will be developed into ports. One is Benty, the southernmost village on the Guinean coast, which is a natural harbor in the Nallacoree River about 10 miles above its mouth. The second is Victoria, a natural harbor in the Rio Nunez about 20 miles above its mouth.

Aside from Conakry, the principal urban areas in the country are the following (showing 1951 census population figures):

Kankan	24,600	N'Zerekore	10,800
Kindia	13,000	Pita	6,800
Labe	11,800	Boko	5,400
Siguiri	11,400	Namou	5,100

B. The Birth of Guinea

Before independence, Guinea had been a French colonial possession since the latter part of the 19th century. Incorporated in 1904 into the French West African Federation as one of its constituent territories, Guinea remained in that status until the French Constitution of 1946 converted it into an Overseas Territory within the French Union. It was represented in the French Parliament by three deputies and two senators and in the Assembly of the French Union by four councillors. By virtue of the French Overseas Reform Act of 1952 Guinea obtained also a Territorial Assembly of 50 members (now converted into the National Assembly of the Republic of Guinea), and a 12-man Governmental Council headed by the Governor, whose native Vice President was, in effect, the territory's premier.

That Guinea has today exchanged French colonial rule for the hazards of independence can be attributed almost entirely to the efforts and decision of Sekou Toure, formerly Premier and today President of Guinea. During his visit to Conakry in the course of his August 1958 tour of France's African colonies to solicit support for his proposed new constitution, General de Gaulle was outraged by

the sharp, rhetorical and disciplined anti-colonial demonstrations organized by Toure. When the dynamic young Guinean leader, speaking from a platform on which de Gaulle was seated, told a Conakry gathering that Guineans "prefer poverty in freedom to riches in slavery," the proud general abruptly cancelled a scheduled dinner with Toure and was piqued into offering the country a choice between independence and membership in the French Community, the commonwealth-like association which his constitution substituted for the then existing French Union. Making it clear that independence would entail cessation of all French financial aid, de Gaulle told the Guineans that a "no" vote in the 28 September constitutional referendum would automatically result in immediate freedom.

It is probable that de Gaulle believed the threat of ending economic subsidies would convince the people of Guinea of the wisdom, if not the necessity, of accepting the constitution. Toure, however, was not intimidated. He campaigned vigorously for rejection of the constitution, and his confidence in his hold on the affections of his people was proven right when Guinea, alone among French colonies, spurned the proposed new order. The overwhelming 95.2 percent negative vote--1,136,000 to 57,000--was, however, probably less of a conscious demand for independence than a reaffirmation of the voters' support for Toure personally. De Gaulle immediately fulfilled his pledge, and on 2 October Paris formally announced that Guinea was henceforth to be considered an independent state.

Despite his actions Toure is not basically anti-French. He is, however, ambitious. As one of the few native political leaders in West Africa with interterritorial stature, he is probably attracted by the idea of the creation of an independent federation of West African territories. He has in effect gambled on his ability to make Guinea into a prosperous and stable state, and it can be accepted that the leaders of other West African areas will be watching his efforts with interest. If he succeeds, he will be in a position to exert the leadership to which he aspires. If he fails, as the French probably hope, Guinea will have little alternative but to seek admission into the French Community, which she has so lately spurned, or to turn to the Soviet Bloc.

In seeking to develop Guinea into a modern and prosperous state, Toure enjoys the advantage of commanding unquestioning devotion in Guinea, particularly among the Soussou, who comprised most of his original labor support. The Malinke also support and respect him for his descent from the almost legendary Almanay Samory, the great Malinke warrior who Islamized much of eastern Guinea and who led a long and bitter struggle against French occupation long after the rest of Guinea had

capitulated. Toure is less enthusiastically acclaimed among the Fulah. However, the possibility of opposition from this sector has been weakened by Toure's action of forming a coalition government which includes members of the Fulah-supported opposition party and of giving cabinet posts to several important Fulah leaders.

Born on 9 January 1922 to an impoverished peasant family at Faranah in the interior, Toure has reached his present eminence through trade union activity and leadership. During his career he has been a delegate to metropolitan conventions of France's Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT), founder and head of the Guinea Labor Federation, organizer of the Confederation General du Travail Africain (a group which seceded from the CGT in February 1956 over demands for union autonomy), and organizer and executive committee member of the Union Generale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noir (UOTAN), which was formed in January 1957 to re-unite the West African labor movement.

Toure's trade union prominence inevitably propelled him into politics. As early as the late 1940's he was active in welding the Guinean branches of the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA) into a powerful political machine, which today is functioning as the Parti Democratique de Guinee (PDG). He emerged as the undisputed leader of the RDA's Guinea section in 1953 when he led a spectacular--and successful--66-day strike to obtain changes in French labor laws.

Since that time his hold on Guinea's political fortunes has not been in danger. In 1956 he was elected mayor of Conakry and also deputy to the French National Assembly (an earlier election in 1951 was invalidated by the French). In May 1956 he also became Vice President of the Guinea Governmental Council, equivalent to being Premier with authority over all internal affairs.

Toure's prominence also inevitably drew him into the interterritorial political arena as a leading RDA figure, and by September 1957 he was strong enough to challenge RDA President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, leader of the Ivory Coast, whose political protege he had long been. At the party convention in Bamako on 25-30 September 1957, Houphouet-Boigny was re-elected RDA president, but Toure nonetheless secured a

personal victory when the convention, over the strong protest of Houphouët-Boigny, strongly supported Toure's demands for immediate effective West African federation.

Although the RDA won landslide electoral victories in 1956 and 1957, it then being the only vigorous interterritorial political movement in West Africa, the situation changed by 1958 when a number of small, anti-RDA parties merged into the Parti du Regroupement Africain (PRA), whose radical demands began to attract an increasing number of adherents. The PRA demand in July 1958 for immediate independence from France and federation of all Black African territories particularly threatened Toure's position of leadership.

Needing an issue to keep himself in the forefront of West African nationalism, Toure seized on the opportunity presented by the referendum on the new de Gaulle constitution. He dramatically ordered his followers to vote "no" and thus, probably without having considered the consequences, led his country onto the world stage.

C. The Consequences of Independence

Guinea is today, from the standpoint of international law, firmly established as a member of the community of nations as the result of her diplomatic recognition by some two score nations, including the United States, England and the Soviet Union. West German recognition was extended on 31 October 1958 by a telegram from Chancellor Adenauer to Toure. And as a result of an application filed on 2 December and approved by the Security Council on 9 December by a 10-0 vote (France abstained), Guinea became the 52nd member of the United Nations on 12 December when the General Assembly also unanimously approved (France again abstaining) her application.

Paradoxically, France, after having spontaneously and unilaterally declared Guinea to be a free independent state, not only tried to delay Guinea's entry in the UN and her recognition by other members of the Atlantic community, but also withheld her own recognition until 15 January 1959. This long delay in recognition, moreover, was accompanied by distinct coolness towards Guinea, apparently largely induced by France's desire to discourage any longings for independence in her other African territories. Guinea, while showing no signs of regretting her choice, nevertheless appears not to desire to sever all political ties with France. On more than one occasion

Toure has stated that Guinea desires to negotiate some sort of arrangement with France as permitted under Article 88 of the de Gaulle constitution.*

The French proclamation of Guinea's independence was accompanied, as de Gaulle had warned it would be, by an announcement that all French funds had been stopped. Paris also announced that all French civil servants, technicians and school teachers would be withdrawn within two months and all military units within three. The new state thus found itself obliged to start out life not only without adequate funds and a national currency but also without a staff of experienced administrators or a military and security organization.

The exodus of Europeans began at once. Within a month probably half of the country's 8,000 European residents--engineers, public administrators, merchants, educators, magistrates, etc.--had departed. The Ministry of Finance, for example, had a staff of 60 Europeans at the beginning of October and only a mere handful at the end of the month. The Ministry of Public Works was left with only 15 African engineers. In all other government services and offices the situation was the same.

The tension in Paris-Conakry relations increased when on 23 November, upon conclusion of a four-day visit to Accra, Toure joined with Ghanaian Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah in announcing plans to link the two states in a "confederacy" which could serve as the "nucleus of a union of West African states." Since Ghana is a member of the British Commonwealth and, as such, of the sterling bloc, Paris viewed the announcement as a British plot to wean Guinea and possibly other French territories out of the franc zone and into the sterling bloc. French suspicions were heightened by Nkrumah's accompanying announcement that, subject to parliamentary approval, Ghana would loan Guinea \$ 10 million "to afford Guinea such technical and administrative aid as may be necessary to strengthen the new state."

* Art. 88 The Republic or the Community may make arrangements with states that wish to associate themselves with the Republic or the Community....

Subsequent events have indicated that neither Ghana nor Guinea has any intention or desire of rushing into any true union and that the 23 November announcement will probably lead to no more than a certain amount of cooperation and consultation on problems of foreign policy. Initial French suspicions of British complicity have been dimmed by the negative reaction to the announcement in Britain itself and the apparent British success in persuading Ghana not to make a hasty loan, as evidenced by the cancellation of a scheduled visit to Conakry by Ghana's Finance Minister.

A relaxation in Paris's attitude was first indicated by the despatch to Conakry on 29 November of a delegation of financial experts for talks on "the conditions of Guinea's adherence to the franc zone." A rapport was quickly reached, and texts of various agreements were ready for signature by 23 December. Although the accords failed to be signed that day as scheduled because of a dispute involving protocol, agreements covering financial matters, technical and administrative cooperation and cultural exchange were finally signed in Paris on 7 January 1959.

According to the announcement made in Paris, the agreements provide for Guinea's position in the franc zone, for the retention of French as Guinea's official language, and for France to cooperate with Guinea in the creation or reorganization of public services and the training of native civil servants and technicians. In the latter connection, Guinea undertakes to employ other foreign personnel only in cases where French citizens are not available.

Although technical in nature, the agreements clearly had political implications and marked the beginning of improved French-Guinean relations. On 15 January, only a week after their signing, the office of French Premier Michel Debre announced formal diplomatic recognition of Guinea with a statement that a charge d'affaires would soon be sent to Conakry. This development obviously clears the way for future discussions on Guinea's possible adherence to the new French community.

It is doubtful, however, that the agreements will lead to a resumption of French economic and financial aid to Guinea. Regardless of how friendly her relations with Guinea become, France will probably feel it necessary to protect her interests by differentiating her treatment of Guinea from that accorded the territories which have agreed to maintain their political ties with France.

The seriousness for Guinea of the loss of French aid can hardly be underestimated. As a French territory Guinea received

direct annual subsidies for certain administrative expenses (\$6.5 million) and military costs (\$10 million) as well as loans to cover the annual budget deficit (\$1 million in 1957). In addition France provided various assistance in the form of scientific research projects, surveys and credit schemes. Guinea enjoyed preferential treatment and subsidized prices for certain of its agricultural products in France and had its annual trade deficit (\$20 million in 1957) absorbed by the franc zone as a whole.

Even more important for Guinea were the public funds which France provided for public development projects through FIDES (Fonds d'Investissement pour le Developpement Economique et Social) and CCFOM (Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer). In the past 10 years such aid totaled more than \$70 million, or more than 50 percent of all funds spent on long-range public development programs. Private French sources supplied an additional unknown but sizable amount.

All these sources have now dried up. French Government funds ceased on the day Guinea became a state. While Paris has not forbidden private French firms to continue investing, neither has it encouraged them to carry on the vast development program already started.

The core of this program is the development and exploitation of the vast bauxite deposits in the Boké and Fria districts, together with the construction of necessary auxiliary facilities. While the financing of the initial stage leading to the production of alumina (estimated cost: \$245 million) is relatively assured even if French interests withdraw, work on the final stage leading to the production of aluminum (estimated cost: \$322 million) is contingent on French investment of \$152 million for construction of a hydroelectric plant and ancillary transportation facilities.

French refusal to furnish funds or to guarantee a \$70 million World Bank loan requested to cover part of its participation would gravely jeopardize the chances of realization of this final stage of the program. The Bank has already indicated that it will delay a decision on the loan until French-Guinean relations are fully clarified. It will insist on assurances that France or some other country guarantee the loan and that the remainder of the financing will definitely be forthcoming.

Considerable work has already been done in the Boké area, about 100 kilometers northwest of Conakry, where the bauxite reserves have been estimated at 300 million tons. Bauxites du

Nidi, an affiliate of Canadian Aluminium Ltd., which is already exploiting the Los deposits, plans eventually to export one million tons of bauxite from Boko as well as to produce 220,000 tons of alumina annually. The project involves construction of a processing plant, an industrial city, a 125-kilometer rail-road, and a deep water port at Kassar, now a village of 200 fishermen and farmers. Begun in 1957 and scheduled for completion in 1962, the project is expected to cost 20 billion francs CFA.

The project at Fria, about 130 kilometers from Conakry, is even larger. Compagnie Pechiney Ugine, a French firm, has organized the Compagnie Internationale Fria, having a capital of one billion francs CFA subscribed by French, British, Swiss and American investors, which is undertaking the construction of a plant to produce 480,000 tons of alumina annually. An industrial city and a 130-kilometer rail link to Conakry are also to be built. Since Conakry's port facilities are not adequate to handle this additional volume of exports, the over-all plan also provides for expansion of that port. Begun in 1957, the project is scheduled to be completed in 1960 at an estimated cost of \$1 billion francs CFA, with full production expected to be reached in 1962.

While these operations and the resulting increased exports will greatly benefit Guinea's economy and foreign trade balance, the country nevertheless looks forward to the day when aluminum rather than merely bauxite or alumina will be exported. This, however, is the final stage now jeopardized by the French. Since the production of aluminum requires large amounts of electric power, the plan calls for development of Guinea's tremendous hydroelectric potential. Specifically, an earthen barrage, 110 meters high and involving the movement of 25 cubic meters of earth, is to be constructed at Souapiti on the Konkoure River. The resulting lake of 500 square kilometers (comparable in size to Lake Geneva) will feed a power plant, which will produce 3 million kilo-watt-hours annually, with a high tension line to Fria. There the power would be used to transform 300,000 tons of alumina annually into 150,000 tons of aluminum, with an ultimate annual production goal of 1,150,000 tons. The entire project will, it is estimated, cost 55 billion francs CFA.

The uncertainty of the availability of Western funds to carry the entire project through to completion, coupled with the determination of Guinea's leaders that the project must be realized despite all the apparent obstacles, has provided the Soviet Bloc with an excellent opportunity to extend to the new state its current economic wooing of uncommitted areas. Evidence that the Kremlin had not failed to perceive

the opportunity was forthcoming when the Soviet Union, on 4 October, became one of the first countries to recognize Guinea, to be followed shortly by Albania, Bulgaria, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, North Korea, North Vietnam and Rumania.

The first tangible results of the Soviet Bloc wooing of Guinea was the signing in Conakry on 17 November of a "commercial and cultural friendship pact" by representatives of Guinea and East Germany. Based on "lasting and fruitful cooperation," the pact--the first international agreement to be concluded by Guinea--provided for an exchange of trade missions and for East Germany to supply industrial plants, textiles, chemical products and various consumer goods in return for Guinean coffee, bananas, oil seeds and other agricultural products, to a total value of \$10 million. Although a cultural section of the agreement provided that East Germany would furnish technicians and cultural aid when requested to do so by Guinea, the restrictions on Guinean employment of foreign technicians contained in the French-Guinea accords of 7 January suggest that this provision is unlikely to be invoked.

It is evident that the pact, though of minor importance in terms of trade, is a significant gain for the Soviet Bloc, since it gives it an entry into Guinea, which the Bloc can now use as a base for further economic, as well as political, penetration of West Africa. Carl Eckloff, DDR Deputy Minister of Commerce, who negotiated the pact, has openly boasted of its political significance. Further Communist wooing of Guinea followed immediately in the form of a five-man Czech mission which arrived in Conakry with the reputed task of negotiating a similar agreement. On 5 December a two-man Soviet delegation also arrived in Conakry and was received by Toure.

This Bloc penetration of Guinea has been facilitated by several factors. Toure is not a Communist, and there is evidence that, while he envisages a neutralist policy for his country, he would prefer to develop relations with the West rather than with the East. Nevertheless, he is a Marxist (he once studied at Prague's Institute for Economic Studies) and reportedly views sympathetically the Bloc's system of government and economy, feeling, moreover, that some form of a socialist economy would be best for his own country. He is also known to resent the West's delay in extending recognition so as not to antagonize France, in contrast to the immediate recognition extended by the Communist Bloc states.

Toure's chief aides can probably also be credited with a role in this matter. Keita Fodeba, his Interior Minister, is known for his former Communist ties. Saifoulaye Diallo, Secretary General of the PDG and President of the Guinean National Assembly, is a staunch defender of a "single-party democracy" and of what the Communists call "democratic centralism." Toure's younger brother Ismail, now Minister of Public Works, is widely regarded as a pro-Communist, as is Abdoulaye Diallo, Secretary of State for Telecommunications, who is a former Vice President of the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.

However, the most decisive influence has undoubtedly been Guinea's desire for economic development and its urgent need for funds for projects already begun or planned. Not only is France no longer a source of these funds, but her policy has caused other Western sources to reconsider their own participation. Since Toure's political future is dependent on his ability to produce economic results for his country, he is being forced to consider the East as a source of funds even though this may damage his personal desire to keep Guinea in the neutralist camp. Sources in the Canadian aluminum industry have, in fact, already reported that the Soviet Union either has offered, or is considering offering, to underwrite the Boko-Fria projects.

D. Challenges to the West

Today Guinea confronts the West with a serious challenge. The exigencies of the international situation clearly make it imperative that the Soviet Bloc not be left free to assume a dominant position in Guinea's economy. At the same time the West must recognize that Guinea's leaders, for political as well as economic reasons, are determined that the economic development of their country shall not be impeded. If they cannot obtain the necessary funds in the West, they will surely seek them in the East. The experience of the Aswan Dam project in Egypt should be sufficient warning to the West that the Soviet Union will not be reticent in exploiting the situation to its own advantage.

The challenge presented by Guinea is one which West Germany is particularly qualified to meet. In meeting the Guinean need for Western funds, German capital would not only be doing a service for the entire Free World but also the specific interests of West Germany. The so-called German Democratic Republic has already signed a trade treaty with the new state. Should Guinea be forced to turn to the East for

development capital, it is not improbable that this trade agreement would be supplemented by one providing for diplomatic relations.

Such a development would obviously be a great triumph for the Pankov regime and a bitter blow to West Germany, for it would represent the first non-Communist country to extend recognition to the puppet regime in the East. And unless and until Guinea is given a reason for not wishing to offend Bonn, there is little that Bonn can do to prevent such a development.

Fortunately, in the case of Guinea the demands of politics would also appear to make economic logic. The country is a potentially rich one, and the opportunities for the profitable investment of Western, including West German, capital are innumerable.

The possibilities offered by development of Guinea's bauxite and iron ore deposits, now no longer monopolized by the French, are the most obvious; and the need for supporting facilities--railroads, roads, ports, housing, hydroelectric installations, etc.--equally merit serious consideration. Indeed, similar installations are needed throughout the country.

Agriculture, which has only begun to be developed, offers further opportunities. It should also be noted that all of Guinea's cities, not excluding Conakry, suffer from a lack of adequate public services--sewerage systems, lighting, telephones, transportation, hospitals, schools, etc. The presence in the country of only 42 buses, for example, suggests how much is still needed in the field of transportation alone.

Economic development in Guinea is inevitable. It only remains to be seen if the West, including West Germany, will respond to the challenge. If it does not, the East will surely do so.